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Abstract – According to recent estimations the financial gap between Large Reactors (LR) and 
Small Medium Reactors (SMRs) seems not as huge as the economy of scale would suggest, so the 
SMRs are going to be important players of the worldwide nuclear renaissance. POLIMI’s INCAS 
model has been developed to compare the investment in SMR with respect to LR. It provides the 
value of IRR (Internal Rate of Return), NPV (Net Present Value), LUEC (Levelised Unitary 
Electricity Cost), upfront investment, etc. The aim of this research is to integrate the actual INCAS 
model, based on discounted cash flows, with the real option theory to measure flexibility of the 
investor to expand, defer or abandon a nuclear project, under future uncertainties. The work 
compares the investment in a large nuclear power plant with a series of smaller, modular nuclear 
power plants on the same site. As a consequence it compares the benefits of the large power plant, 
coming from the economy of scale, to the benefit of the modular project (flexibility) concluding 
that managerial flexibility can be measured and used by an investor to face the investment risks.  
.I INTRDUCTION 
Small Medium Reactors (SMRs) could be an 
important component of the worldwide nuclear 
renaissance because they require a lower upfront capital 
cost. Respect to Large Reactors (LRs) they are also 
somewhat simpler and safer, offering on top of that an 
option to increase the power generation capacity by adding 
successive NPP modules on the same site. One of the main 
issues is to assess their competitiveness since the 
economies of scale labels these reactors as not 
economically competitive with respect to larger ones. 
However SMRs have the attractive feature of flexibility in 
the deployment. An economic model (INCAS - Integrated 
model for the Competitiveness Assessment of SMRs) is 
currently developed by Politecnico di Milano (POLIMI) in 
the framework of an international effort fostered by IAEA 
on SMRs competitiveness. INCAS is suitable to compare 
the economic performance of SMRs with respect to LRs. 
INCAS performs an investment project simulation and 
assessment of SMRs and LRs deployment scenarios, 
providing monetary indicators (e.g. IRR, LUEC, total 
equity invested) with not-monetary indicators (e.g. design 
robustness, required spinning reserve). 27I.A Aim of the work 
Regarding the comparison between 4 SMR (of 335 MWe 
each) and a LR (of 1340 MWe) Boarin and Ricotti 
analysed the problem in detail using the INCAS model1 . 
They use a sensitivity analysis to show that SMRs 
project’s NPV improves against LR with increasing Debt-
to-Equity ratio, by reducing the financial risk and 
increasing the investment profitability (TABLE 1). We 
aim to deal with the same comparison: 4 SMR of 335 
MWe each and 1 LR of 1340 MWe (even if the approach 
is obviously valid for any kind of plant of any size) 
focusing on the flexibility value. 
TABLE 1 INCAS result with a DCF analysis. Data from 1 
 
4x335MWe SMRs 
1x1340MWe 
LR 
 
Base case 
(*) 
Concentration 
schedule (*) 
IRR 13,1% 13,4% 14,5% 
NPV 240 M€ 318 M€ 608 M€ 
Debt (**) 1827 M€ 2211 M€ 2115 M€ 
Self-financing (***) 19% 11% 0% 
(*) Base case scenario: 13 years, Concentration schedule: 10 years (**) 
E/(E+D) = 45% (***) Calculated with an electricity price of 80 $/MWh 
I.B Limits of a DCF methodology 
The present version of INCAS is based on a 
“Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)” approach. DCF is a 
capital budget method looking at projects in isolation 2,3. It 73
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determines the future cash flows that the project may 
generate and discounts them to today’s value at a project-
specific discount rate reflecting their perceived risk. So 
risk is measured indirectly since the discount rate 
represents the opportunity cost of capital, which is the rate 
of return expected by an investor. In this context, 
traditional project appraisal assumes that the firm will 
embark on a rigid and inflexible path forward, without the 
possibility to respond and adjust to any changes in e.g. 
market, supplier, regulation, etc. DCF ignores that the 
risk-pattern of the project is likely to change over time and 
the value of managerial flexibility to react to future 
uncertainties. These limits are partially reduced by 
probabilistic DCF approaches but even in this context the 
approach is unrealistic since: (1) new information may be 
available in the future and the original investment plan 
could change accordingly (2) investments often come in 
natural, sequential steps with multiple “go” or “no-go” 
decision points that allow management to respond to any 
changes in the market or in regulation, or to adapt to 
technological breakthroughs. Managers have the right, but 
not the obligation, to adjust to the environment by 
accelerating, expanding, contracting or even abandoning 
the project along the way. Hence, a DCF-based project 
assessment would be appropriate if there is uncertainty but 
not managerial flexibility; ROA considers and evaluates 
this flexibility. 
Surely, in the scenario in which many 335 MWe 
SMRs are compared to a few 1340 MWe LRs, an investor 
has the possibility to schedule the construction of the 
different reactors considering at each step the value of 
some relevant parameters such as licensing time and cost, 
electricity price, equipment cost, etc. 
The final research question that this paper addresses is 
therefore: “What is the difference in profitability 
between SMRs and LRs calculated using the ROA 
approach versus DCF approach?” 
II LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main inadequacy to capital budgeting of the DCF 
approaches (e.g. NPV) is that they ignore, or cannot 
properly capture, management’s flexibility to adapt and 
revise later decisions 4 and so it is inappropriate in valuing 
the flexibility given to managers by the SMR. The 
methodology based on the concept of ROA is a new 
paradigm shift in the way of thinking about and evaluating 
projects5. The Real Options value is always higher than 
the NPV and the difference becomes more obvious for 
projects with higher uncertainty; in fact, valuing decisions 
in a deterministic view, assuming that all outcomes are 
static and decisions made are irrevocable, may potentially 
grossly underestimate the intrinsic value of a project. 
Strategic options can provide decision-makers the 
opportunity to hedge their bets in the face of uncertainty 277by making midcourse corrections. They reduce the 
negative side of the risk increasing the returns of the 
project5. These important aspects can be properly analysed 
by considering investment opportunities as collections of 
options on real assets (or real options). Gollier
6
 also 
suggests the use of the theory of Real Options to value the 
option to invest in successive modules. The analysis 
however is limited to electricity price uncertainty, while 
the hereto presented model takes into account different 
sources of uncertainty. 
II.A Choosing the options 
This section presents the options that we consider 
more practical and useful to analyse an investment in 
nuclear reactors. Acquiring licenses for the construction of 
four reactors is the basic condition which provides the 
possibility to exercise options. The license’s cost is the 
price of acquiring the chance to decide when to exercise or 
not an option.  
An investor has several options; we focused on the 
two that seems more relevant and intuitive. 
WAIT TO EXPAND: until the licenses are not yet 
expired exists the possibility to choose whether to go on 
with the project and increase capacity with new reactors or 
not. When there is uncertainty and risk, it may be a good 
idea waiting until these uncertainties partially decrease 
with time. 
ABANDON: if it is not convenient to go on with the 
construction of all the four reactors, the project can be 
abandoned; this could happen for instance after a long 
deferment, following a collapse in electricity price or after 
a substantial increase in equipment cost.  
II.B Real options pricing model 
The most popular methods to evaluate real options 
are: Binomial lattice, partial-differential equations, closed-
form solutions and simulations 5. 
Analytical methods are based on equations that can be 
solved through a set of input assumptions; they are exact, 
quick, and easy to implement. However they apply 
sophisticated mathematical weaponry and they are very 
specific in nature, with limited modeling flexibility. 
Moreover, in real option models the usually high number 
of stochastic variables make it impossible to obtain closed-
form analytical solutions5,7, 8.  
TABLE 2 summarises the main methods. The Least 
Squares Method (LSM) is proposed to valuing multi-
options and multi-assets problems based on the simulation 
approach as presented by Longstaff and Schwartz9. This 
simulation method requires a computational effort which 
is linear with respect to the dimension of the state space. 
This approach has been utilized in similar contexts 10,11. 
 4
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TABLE 2 Real options valuation methods 5,12, 
13,14,15,9,16, 17 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
C
lo
se
d
-f
o
rm
 
so
lu
ti
o
n
s 
They are exact, not 
approximation 
Quick and easy to 
implement 
Widely used for 
pricing financial 
options 
Difficult to explain 
Very specific in nature 
They need specific distribution 
assumption for the underlying to 
be applied 
They can’t be applied if the strike 
price behaves stochastically 
B
in
o
m
ia
l 
o
r 
M
u
lt
in
o
m
ia
l 
Highly flexible 
Easy to implement 
Easy to explain 
Impractical in situations where 
there are multiple factors 
They need specific distribution 
assumption for the underlying to 
be applied 
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Highly flexible 
Transparent 
Simple 
Permits a wide set of 
value drivers 
Allows state variables 
to follow general 
stochastic processes 
It could require a high 
computational effort 
It approximates the real value 
II.C The state variables choice 
State Variables are the parameters influencing the 
investor strategy. The correct management of the 
uncertainty linked to them is the strength of ROA. The 
state variables analysed in this section are the ones 
combining the greatest impact and uncertainty on the 
economic and financial parameters. These state variables 
are: Electricity Price, Equipment Cost, Licensing Time 
and Cost 
II.C.1 The Electricity Price 
The most fundamental parameter jeopardising the 
value of investment in liberalised market is the uncertainty 
about electricity prices 18. 
INCAS model assumes that all the electricity 
produced is sold in the market. Several papers have 
pointed out some general characteristics of the power price 
behaviour that should be considered. Some authors19-21 
argue that a model for electricity prices should incorporate 
a form of time-dependant volatility and the possibility of 
jumps in prices. Others, on the contrary, have stressed the 
importance of the periodic seasonal behaviour of 
electricity prices, and its reversion to mean levels22. The 
main models are:  
 ARIMA Models and Others 23-25 
 Mean reverting regime switching Process 26, 27 
 Mean reverting jump diffusion Process 19-21, 28-30 
 Mean Reverting Process 22, 31, 32 
 Brownian Motion Process 6, 33 34 
The main stochastic processes used to value 
commodity derivatives are: Geometric Brownian Motion, 27Mean-Reversion, Mean Reverting Jump Diffusion and 
Mean Reverting Regime Switching. The most known 
process is the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) which 
has been used in multiple fields, including finance, to 
model the behaviour of security prices.  
The main properties of this process are: price changes 
are independent of each other (no memory) and price 
changes have a constant mean and volatility33. Prices 
follow a Markov chain in the sense that the expected price 
level at given time in the future depends only on today’s 
price. Mean reversion models, however, allow for a 
dependency of price jumps as prices tend to revert to a 
certain mean level with a strength that depends upon the 
distance to such mean level. In the jump diffusion model, 
price change dynamics can be divided into two distinct 
forms: a ‘normal’, continuous price diffusion process and 
an ‘abnormal’, discontinuous jump process modelled by a 
Poisson distribution19, 21, 28. Historically, electricity prices 
do not jump, but ‘spike’. That is, they do not jump to a 
new level and stay there, but rather quickly revert to their 
previous levels. The use of mean reversion alongside 
jumps allows us to simulate this spiking behaviour.  
Mean reverting jump diffusion processes are able to 
capture a spike behaviour but it is assumed that all shocks 
affecting the price series die out at the same rate. In reality 
two types of shocks exist implying different reversion 
rates: large disturbances, which diminish rapidly due to 
economic forces, and moderate ones, which might persist 
for a while30. For this reason the best process to model the 
electricity price is a Mean reverting regime switching 
process.  
 
Random Walk with Mean Reversion 
           ( 
     )      
Where: 
S* is the mean reversion level or the long run 
equilibrium price 
St is the spot price 
α is the mean reversion rate 
σ is the volatility 
ε is the random shock to price from (t) to (t+1) 
 
The mean reversion component or ‘drift’ term is 
driven by the distance between the current price and the 
mean reversion level as well as by the mean reversion rate. 
If the spot price is below the mean reversion level, the 
mean reversion component will be positive, resulting in an 
upward influence on the spot price. Alternatively, if the 
spot price is above the mean reversion level, the mean 
reversion component will be negative, thus exerting a 
downward influence on the spot price31. 
The Mean Reversion Rate is the speed at which prices 
revert and can be calculated in a very simple and robust 
manner by regressing electricity price changes and 
previous price levels; the negative of the slope of the 
regression line is the Mean Reversion Rate. The Mean 75
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Reversion Level is the long-run equilibrium price and is 
the price value (x_value) in the regression equation when 
the electricity price (y_value) change is nil. Finally, the 
volatility of price changes is given by the residual standard 
deviation, which is the standard error of the forecast 
‘y_value’ for each ‘x_value’ in the regression. 
II.C.2 Equipment cost 
The investment cost can be divided into different cost 
items. The Equipment Cost accounts for 40% of the Total 
Overnight Investment Cost 35 and has a large volatility. It 
makes sense to use a GBM; generally this assumption is 
more appropriate for the project value but it can be used 
also for investment cost, following Schwartz and 
Trigeorgis36. 
 
              √   
Where: 
   is the mean or the drift 
σ is the annual standard deviation 
   is the time step in years 
 
In order to simulate possible future Equipment Cost, 
the GBM process was chosen because it requires only two 
parameters: the starting cost and the expected variability. 
For what concerns the expected volatility, there are several 
methods to estimate it. Some authors prefer to use 
estimates based on historical prices (‘historical 
volatilities’), while others prefer to use the volatilities 
implied by indicators for the volatility of commodities 
(‘implied volatilities’)33. Because of the lack of data and 
considering that nowadays there is no small-reactor under 
construction or operation, it’s not possible to estimate 
accurately these two variables. Therefore it was assumed a 
reasonable value as starting cost, according to Boarin and 
Du37,38. A sensitivity analysis with simulations for 
different values of volatility has been performed, assessing 
how the volatility affects the option value.  
II.C.3 Licensing Time and Cost 
The licensing time is an underlying a little bit 
different from the other two previously discussed, because 
it doesn’t follow a particular process like a Mean 
Reverting Process or a GBM but rather it should be 
modelled as a probability distribution. The probability 
distribution for this state variable is a PERT distribution 
(also known as Beta PERT), a typical default choice to 
model time distribution 39. 
The licensing cost is the option price of the real option 
model, i.e. the price which an investor is willing to pay, 
reserving in the future the right but not the obligation to 
exercise the option. In this case, this means that an 
investor is willing to pay this sum, obtaining the right to 
decide the best moment to build a reactor. Hence, the 
option price is a sunk cost and normally an investor 
requires that the option value will exceed it. It is possible 277to estimate this cost as a function of time, as 40 shows. 
Therefore, taking in to consideration the U.S.A. scenario, 
the licensing cost is modelled as a linear function of time 
simply obtained by multiplying the professional staff-hour 
rate of $259  
III MODEL 
The model proposed can be integrated with INCAS, the 
Discounted cash flow model developed by POLIMI in 
collaboration with IAEA41. TABLE 19 shows a 
comparison with this model and previous studies. Figure 1 
presents the black box of the model. It shows that the main 
inputs are the state variables and, as outputs, the value of 
flexibility for LR and SMR 
 
Figure 1 Black-box of the model 
This model evaluates the option on a project with one 
reactor each time. Evaluating more options and reactors is 
simple: the algorithm is the same, the only difference 
being that in the comparison between exercising and 
waiting, the value to exercise has to be increased by an 
amount equal to the option value on remaining reactors. 
For example to assess the flexibility of a project with four 
reactors, the value of the third reactor must be increased 
by the value of the fourth reactor, the second reactor 
embeds the value to build the third etc. back to the first. 
IV RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
IV.A Static Results 
. Due to the discount rate, the more expanded is the 
scheduling the lower is the Free Cash Flows from 
Operations (FCFO) without option, and as consequence 
the higher is the Option Value. However it is important to 
underline that a more diluted scenario has other 
advantages (like more self-financing and a lower financial 
exposure) which are not taken into account in this model. 
Starting from these results the following sensitivity 
analysis shows the effects on the Option Value.  
TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 report the values which 
characterize the evolution of the state variables and the 6
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other most important variables. On the basis of these 
values the outputs are in TABLE 5. Due to the discount 
rate, the more expanded is the scheduling the lower is the 
Free Cash Flows from Operations (FCFO) without option, 
and as consequence the higher is the Option Value. 
However it is important to underline that a more diluted 
scenario has other advantages (like more self-financing 
and a lower financial exposure) which are not taken into 
account in this model. Starting from these results the 
following sensitivity analysis shows the effects on the 
Option Value.  
TABLE 3 State variable values 
Underlying Parameter Value 
Licensing time  
7-12 semesters 
(Pert distribution) 
Electricity price 
Speed 
Long Run Mean 
28% / year 
69,90 €/MWh 
Equipment cost 
Drift 
Volatility 
%on investment cost 
2% /year 
15% /year  
40% 
 
TABLE 4 Other input variables’ values 
Variable Value 
Inflation 2% 
Risk free rate 3% 
Tax rate 30% 
Equity cost 15% 
Equity / (Equity + Debt) 50% 
Debt cost 7% 
 
TABLE 5 Base case results  
Scheduling deployment 
scenario 
FCFO without 
option [M€] 
Option value 
[M€,%] 
1 (9 years) 502,8 107,4 (21,4%) 
2 (12 years) 495 115,2 (23,3%) 
3 (15 years) 487,4 122,8 (25,2%) 
IV.B Sensitivity Analysis 
IV.B.1 Financial Parameters 
In this section we analyse how the costs of debt and 
equity and they relative percentages affect the results. In 
particular it will be considered a “Merchant case”, where 
the project is subjected to the laws of the free market, a 
“Supported case”, where the state guarantees bank loans, 
(both scenarios are taken from Boarin37) and two 
intermediate cases, where two intermediate Weighted 
Average Costs of Capital (WACC) have been considered, 
in order to better understand the influence of this 
parameters. TABLE 6 summarizes the four scenarios. 
 27TABLE 6 Financial cases  
Case Ke %Equity Kd % Debt WACC 
Merchant 15% 50% 7% 50% 9,95% 
Supported 10% 20% 5% 80% 4,80% 
Intermediate 1 13% 50% 7% 50% 7,55% 
Intermediate 2 15,8% 50% 7% 50% 8,95% 
 
In the Merchant case scenario both shareholders and 
lenders will require a high capital remuneration to cover 
long-term business risk. For this reason financing this 
nuclear project would only be possible through corporate 
financing with nuclear business risk being diluted within a 
diversified business portfolio of shareholders and with 
shareholders’ assets as collateral to guarantee bank loans 
(TABLE 7) 
TABLE 7 Merchant case’s output  
FCFO without option 502,8 [M€] 
Licensing cost 1st reactor 1,4 [M€] 
Licensing cost other reactors 0,4 [M€] 
FCFO with option 610,2 [M€] 
OPTION VALUE 107,4 (+21%) [M€] 
 
The Supported case takes its name from the fact that 
the state ‘supports’ the investment in a nuclear plant, 
guaranteeing the bank loan, and that long-term electricity 
sale contracts are assumed. For this reason, the probability 
of financial default decreases and there is a high growth of 
the FCFO (TABLE 8) 
TABLE 8 Supported case’s output 
FCFO without option 6202,3 [M€] 
Licensing cost 1st reactor 1,4 [M€] 
Licensing cost other reactors 0,4 [M€] 
FCFO with option 6202,4 [M€] 
OPTION VALUE 0,1 (<0,01%) [M€] 
 
Finally the other two scenarios have been analysed, 
considering a WACC value between the two previous 
ones, in order to have a more complete view of how this 
parameters affect the option value (TABLE 9). 
TABLE 9 E and D Costs and Percentage’s sensitivity results  
Case WACC 
FCFO 
without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option 
Value 
Merchant 9,95% 502,8 610,2 21% 
Supported 4,80% 6202,3 6202,5 <0,01% 
Intermediate 1 7,55% 2178,8 2200,5 1% 
Intermediate 2 8,95% 1062,9 1117,4 5% 
 
The value of optionality stands in the ability of the 
management to react to business conditions and in 
particular to the possibility to abandon the project if these 
conditions are not as good as requested. So, the greater is 
the probability of default the greater will be the option 
value. In the “Supported case” the low cost of capital 77
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makes the investment very convenient, and so the 
consequence is a low value of optionality. Vice versa, in a 
situation subjected to the laws of free market, it becomes 
extremely important for the management to value 
accurately business conditions. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the WACC has a 
strong impact on the percentage value of the option. A 
reduction of 10% of the cost of capital (from 9,95% to 
8,95%) causes a corresponding reduction of 76% of the 
percentage of the option value (from 21% to 5%) and a 
decrease of 25% of WACC (from 9,95% to 7,50%) causes 
a corresponding decrease of 95% in the option value (from 
21% to 1%). This is summarized in Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 Option Value with different WACC 
IV.B.2 Licensing  
In this section it will be shown how the first of the 
three state variables impacts on the option value. The 
licensing time can vary from a minimum of 7 semesters 
and a maximum of 12. TABLE 10 summarizes the results. 
TABLE 10 Licensing time’s sensitivity results  
Licensing time 
FCFO without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option 
Value 
7 semesters 502,8 610,2 21% 
9 semesters 498 609,4 22% 
11 semesters 492,5 609,5 24% 
12 semesters 489,2 609,2 24,5% 
 
The licensing time seems not to affect the FCFO with 
option. Indeed, despite small differences in licensing costs 
and different discount rates, the scheduling flexibility 
allows to mitigate these effects. Vice versa, FCFO without 
option, not having scheduling flexibility, is affected by the 
discount rate and the longer licensing time is the lower its 
value becomes (and so the higher is the percentage of 
option value) as shown in Figure 3. However licensing 
time is not such an important variable driving the 
optionality value. Figure 3 shows how FCFO with option 
is independent from licensing time, while FCFO without 
option shows a slight decreasing. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
4.000% 5.000% 6.000% 7.000% 8.000% 9.000% 10.000%
Wacc 
% Option Value 27Paper 12233 
 
Figure 3 FCFOs with different licensing times  
IV.B.3 Electricity price 
It is important to check whether the option model is 
sensitive to the mean reversion rate, which is one 
important feature the electricity price behaviour. The 
results are shown in TABLE 11. 
TABLE 11 Electricity speed’s sensitivity results  
Electricity Mean 
Reversion Rate 
FCFO without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option 
Value 
7% 452,3 690,3 53% 
14% 488,9 629,3 29% 
28% 502,8 610,2 21% 
42% 503,2 604,4 20% 
56% 503,1 603,6 20% 
 
A slower Mean Reversion Rate involves a higher 
optionality. As long as the electricity price is low, the 
scheduling will be postponed until the price grows, 
avoiding a low profitability situation. On the other hand, if 
the price is high the reactors will be scheduled as soon as 
possible in order to take advantage of this temporary extra-
profitability situation. For speeds greater than 30%, this 
parameter seems not to have an effect on the option value 
(Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4 Option Value with different Mean Reversion Rates  
The Long run mean or Mean reversion level is the 
long-run equilibrium price. Starting from the reference 
value of 69,9 €/MWh, it has been increased 15% and 30% 
470
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and decreased of 15% as shown in TABLE 12. This value 
has not been decreased more than 15% because in this 
case the project will result strongly no-profitable. 
TABLE 12 Electricity Long Run mean’s sensitivity results 
Electricity Long 
Run Mean 
FCFO without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option Value 
59,4 €/MWh -317,9 117,9 137% 
69,9 €/MWh 502,8 610,2 21% 
80,4 €/MWh 1293,8 1337,8 3,4% 
90,9 €/MWh 2054,3 2088,7 1,7% 
A higher long run mean makes the project more 
profitable, reducing the probability of default and so the 
optionality. Vice versa, a lower reversion level leads to a 
lower profitability but increases the option value (see 
Figure 5). In particular results for a Long Run Mean of 
59,4 €/MWh (see TABLE 13) illustrate a very meaningful 
example showing the difference between DCF and ROA. 
Indeed, while an evaluation including management 
flexibility leads to positive results, an evaluation based on 
DCF leads to a negative expected FCFO, underestimating 
the project value.  
 
 
Figure 5 Option value with different Long Run Means. The 
Percentage Option Value is not reported because when FCFO are 
negative it cannot be calculated 
TABLE 13 Long Run Mean 59,4 €/MWh  
FCFO without option [M€] -317,9 
Licensing cost 1st reactor [M€] 1,4 
Licensing cost other reactors [M€] 0,4 
FCFO with option [M€] 117,9 
OPTION VALUE [M€] 435,8 
IV.B.4 Equipment cost 
Finally it is important to check the variations of the 
third underlying on optionality. Equipment cost is the most 
influential underlying because it is the higher source of 
uncertainty. The reference value for the drift is +2%, equal 
to the inflation value. Two other scenarios have been 
tested, with no drift and with a negative drift. Results are 
summarized in TABLE 14. 
.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
55 65 75 85 95
Long Run Mean 
Option Value [M€] 277 
Figure 6 Option value with different Equipment Drifts  
TABLE 14 Equipment volatility’s sensitivity results  
Equipment 
volatility 
FCFO without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option 
Value 
7,5% 501,3 536,7 7% 
10% 499,8 556,4 11% 
15% 502,8 610,2 21% 
20% 488,3 670,3 37% 
22,5% 487,4 712,1 46% 
 
After the WACC, equipment volatility is the most 
important factor that affects optionality. This is a 
consequence of the choice of the Equipment cost as the 
most uncertain factor, assuming a Brownian Motion as the 
process which drives its evolution. The relationship 
between equipment volatility and Percentage Option 
Value is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7Option value with different Equipment Volatilities  
Equipment Percentage on Investment cost: up to now, 
the best estimates suggest that the equipment costs are 
about 40% of the total investment cost. However it is 
interesting to see how by modifying this percentage, 
results change (TABLE 15). 
The analysis shows a linear increase of the Option 
value percentage with Equipment percentage on the Total 
Investment Cost. This relation appears clear in Figure 8 
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TABLE 15 Equipment percentage on Investment cost’s 
sensitivity results  
Equipment 
percentage on 
Investment cost 
FCFO without 
option 
FCFO with 
option 
% Option 
Value 
30% 501,3 566,7 13% 
35% 498,4 581,9 17% 
40% 502,8 610,2 21% 
45% 502,6 629,4 25% 
50% 500,6 649,3 30% 
 
 
Figure 8 Option value with different percentages of Equipment 
on Investment cost  
Finally the last section of the Sensitivity Analysis 
compares the LR case to the SMR case. TABLE 16 
summarizes the results obtained by modifying the 
variables with a bigger impact on optionality and 
compares a LR project versus a 4 SMRs one. 
TABLE 16 LR VS SMR  
Scenario 
FCFO without option FCFO with option 
LR 
project 
SMRs 
project 
Differen
ce 
LR 
project 
SMRs 
project 
Difference 
Base 
case 
- 641,8 502,8 21,7% 747,4 610,2 18,4% 
Electri
city 
Speed 14% 632,8 488,9 22,7% 792,8 629,3 20,6% 
Speed 56% 642,5 503,1 21,7% 746,3 603,6 19,1% 
Long Run Mean 
59,4 € 
-52,6 -317,9 504% 263,9 117,9 55,3% 
Long Run Mean 
80,4 € 
1328,3 1293,8 2,6% 1357,6 1337,8 1,5% 
Equip
ment 
Volatility 10% 639,7 499,8 21,9% 685,7 556,4 18,9% 
Volatility 20% 640,7 488,3 23,8% 844,7 670,3 20,6% 
Percentage on 
Investment 30% 
638,8 501,3 21,5% 702,7 566,7 19,4% 
Percentage on 
Investment 50% 
644,7 500,6 22,4% 795,4 649,3 18,4% 
 
On the basis of these results it is evident that 
modelling flexibility implies an important increase of LR 
and SMRs project assessments. Moreover an evaluation 
based on ROA shows a lower gap between LR and SMRs. 
However the gap reduction is not so marked because a 
SMRs project not only has flexibility, but also an LR 
project can take advantage due to the embedded options as 
shown above.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
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Is it now possible to answer to the research question: 
How much does the profitability of SMRs change with 
respect to LRs, if a ROA approach is used instead of a 
DCF approach? 
The profitability is measured in terms of FCFO 
obtained with a Real Option Approach and FCFO obtained 
with a Discounted Cash Flow methodology. The option 
value is the difference between the two FCFOs. The 
profitability index is the ratio of the FCFO with option to 
the total investment cost. 
TABLE 17 SMRs and LR, DCF and ROA Profitability in the 
base case scenario  
Type of 
Project 
FCFO [M€] with 
DCF Methodology 
FCFO [M€] with 
Real Option 
Option value 
M€ (%) 
Profitability 
Index 
4 SMRs 
1340 MWe 
495,0 (2) 610 
115,2 
(23,3%) 
13,12% 
1 LR 
1340 MWe 
641,8 747,4 
105,6 
(16,5%) 
15,99% 
(1), (2), (3) Scheduling scenarios (9- 12- 15 years deployment) 
 
As can be seen in TABLE 17 the option value is 
bigger in a project of four SMRs, but it’s also significant 
for a large reactor. This happens to be so because for LR 
there is also a first option, in which management has the 
right, but not the obligation, to identify the right moment 
in which to start the construction. The profitability index is 
bigger for LR because SMRs’ total investment cost is 7% 
higher. TABLE 18 reports the value of the managerial 
flexibility given by a modular nuclear power plant of four 
335 MWe SMR with respect to a large reactor of 1340 
MWe. 
TABLE 18 LR VS SMRs Project GAP Analysis  
 DCF Methodology [M€] ROA [M€] GAP 
Reductio
n 
 
Scenario 
LR 
project 
SMRs 
project 
GAP 
LR 
project 
SMRs 
project 
GAP 
Merchant 642 502,8 21,7% 747,4 610,2 18,4% -3,3% 
Intermediate 1 2408 2179 9,5% 2413 2200 8,8% -0,7% 
Intermediate 2 1120 1063 5,14% 1162,9 1117 3,9% -1,24% 
Supported 6924 6202 10,4% 6924 6202 10,4% 0% 
 
All the values obtained applying real option theory, 
except for the one in the Supported case, are larger than 
the ones obtained applying DCF. In the Supported 
scenario a nuclear power plant project is encouraged from 
the government and therefore for an investor the risk is 
very low. For this reason the policy is to invest now, 
without any need to wait until future uncertainties are 
resolved. For a small-medium reactors project, results 
suggest to construct all the reactors sequentially, following 
a concentrate schedule. For this reason the managerial 
flexibility value is very small. In general, accounting for 
managerial flexibility reduces the gap between single 0
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phase and modular nuclear projects. The greater the 
probability of default or uncertainty is, the higher the 
optionality value is. 
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper 
proves that managerial flexibility has a value and this 
value is always higher in a modular project (where 
management can take advantage of more strategic options) 
than in a one-reactor project (where there is only one 
starting option). The analysis of results taking account of 
flexibility as well as “external factors”, together with other 
important aspects (self-financing, a lower financial 
exposure, etc.) make a project of four SMRs interesting by 
itself even if a LR project still remains more profitable 
from a purely financial point of view. 
The results of this research seems even more 
interesting if considered as recent research show as SMR 
can be competitive with other base load technologies49. In 
particular the SMR seem a valuable investment in case of 
high CO2 cost49 and to diversify the investment 
portfolio50. 
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